



by Randall W. Berts Randal W. Bsis is an assistant
vice president and economist at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
The author is pateM to Michael
Be». Douglas Dalertwg. Kevin
Duffy-Oeno. Michael Fogarty. WU-
liam Fox, and CW Sco Pa*, for els-
cussens that were helpful in fonru-
lating some of the ideas presented in
this paper.
Introduction
Recent attention given to the serious deterioration
of the nation's public infrastructure raises the
question of whether public capital significantly
affects economic development. Local policy-
makers and researchers concerned with regional
issues have claimed for years that public infra-
structure investment is one of the primary means
to implement a strategy of regional growth. In
fact, one of the ways local governments compete
for new firms is through investing in various
types of public facilities.
Yet, very little is known about even the most
basic relationships between public and private
investment, such as the propensity to substitute
between public and private capital, the relative
timing of public and private investment, and the
effect of public investment on firm and house-
hold decisions, to mention a few. Recent research
by Aschauer (19H9) and Munnell (1990) reports
a positive correlation between public infrastruc-
ture and productivity aggregated to the national
level. However, this research has not identified
empirically the linkages by which public infra-
structure affects productivity by addressing ques-
tions such as the ones posed above. From a
research standpoint, one of the benefits of exam-
ining the effect of infrastructure at the regional
level as opposed to the national level is that the
linkages between physical infrastructure and
those that use it are more direct when the analy-
sis focuses on smaller geographical areas.
The purpose of this paper is to summarize
previous work that has examined the effect of
public infrastructure on various types of eco-
nomic activity at the state and local levels. Sec-
tion I defines public infrastructure and discusses
various ways to measure it that are useful for
analytical purposes. Section II examines the
effects of public infrastructure on regional
growth by first reviewing regional growth theory
and then presenting empirical evidence of this
relationship. Section III raises the issue of
whether the observed effect of public infrastruc-
ture on regional growth results from its effect on
productivity or from its effect on factors of pro-
duction. The subsequent discussion focuses on
public infrastructure as an input into the firms
production process. Section IV briefly examines
the effect of public infrastructure on household
location decisions. Finally, the "causation" of
public and private investment is discussed in
section V. The paper concludes with an overall
assessment of the relationship between public
infrastructure and regional growth.
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This paper focuses on the public works compo-
nent of public infrastructure. This category
includes roads, streets, bridges, water treatment
and distribution systems, irrigation, waterways,
airports, and mass transit—installations and facil-
ities that are basic to the growth and functioning
of an economy. The term public infrastructure
includes a range of investments broader than
public works investment. To distinguish between
the various functions of different types of infra-
structure, several definitions and classifications
are used throughout the literature.
For example, Hansen (1965), in looking at the
role of public investment in economic develop-
ment, divides public infrastructure into two cate-
gories.- economic overhead capital (EOC) and
social overhead capital (SOC). EOC is oriented
primarily toward the direct support of productive
activities or toward the movement of economic
goods and includes most of the public works
projects listed above. SOC is designed to enhance
human capital and consists of social services
such as education, public health facilities, fire
and police protection, and homes for the aged.
Other classifications of public infrastructure
include investments by the private sector. Mera
(1973), examining the economic effects of public
infrastructure in Japan, extends Hansen's defini-
tion of EOC to include communication systems,
railroads, and pollution-abatement equipment.
Mera also expands the SOC list of investments to
include administrative systems. In some studies,
the term infrastructure also includes the spatial
concentration of specific sets of economic activi-
ties, similar to what urban and regional econo-
mists refer to as agglomeration economies.
Common to all of these classifications of public
infrastructure are two characteristics that distin-
guish them from other types of investment. First,
public infrastructure provides the basic founda-
tion for economic activity. Second, it generates
positive spillovers: that is, its sixial benefits far
exceed what any individual would be willing to
pay for its services. These positive spillovers
occur for at least three reasons. First, some com-
ponents'of public infrastructure, such as rouds
and waterways, are nonexcludable services.
Users can share these facilities up to a point
without decreasing the benefits received by
other users. Second, some infrastructure invest-
ments, exemplified by water treatment facilities
and pollution-abatement equipment, reduce
negative externalities (for example, pollution)
generated by the private sector. Third, many
infrastructure projects, such as power-generating
facilities, communication networks, sewer sys-
tems, and highways, exhibit economies of scale.
Because the large costs of these investments can
be spread among many users, the unit cost of
production continually falls as more users gain
access to the system.
For the purposes of this paper, the scope of
public infrastructure is limited to public works
investment. Public works projects, in addition to
exhibiting many of the public infrastructure
characteristics listed above, are also under direct
government control and thus can be effective
public policy instruments in promoting eco-
nomic development.
Measurement
One reason for the lack of empirical work on the
effect of public infrastructure on economic
development is the paucity of consistent and
accurate measures of infrastructure that are suit-
able for empirical analysis. Unlike measures of
private input usage in manufacturing, there are
no reliable and consistent government sources
of information on public infrastructure, particu-
larly for individual states and metropolitan areas.
Two basic approaches have been suggested
for measuring public infrastructure. One method
is to measure physical capital in monetary terms
by adding up past investment. An alternative
approach is to use physical measures by taking
inventory of the quantity and quality of all perti-
nent structures and facilities. Each approach has
its advantages and disadvantages.
The standard method of measuring private
capital stock is to use the monetary approach,
often referred to as the perpetual inventory tech-
nique. The measure of capital under this method
is the sum of the value of past capital purchases
adjusted for depreciation and discard. Two
assumptions are essential in using this scheme.
First, the purchase price of a unit of capital,
which is used to weight each unit of capital,
reflects the discounted value of its present and
future marginal products. Second, a constant
proportion of investment in each period is used
to replace old capital (depreciation). The first
assumption is met if a perfectly competitive capi-
tal market exists. The second assumption is ful-
filled if accurate estimates of the asset's average
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A frequent criticism of the |x.T|x*tual inventory
appnxich for public capiuil stock is that the
gwernment is not subject to competitive
markets, and public gtxxls are not allocated
through a price mechanism. In some cases, user
charges such as gasoline taxes finance local pub
lie infrastructure investment, but this reflects
average costs more than marginal costs.
A considerable portion of the analysis related
to economic development is based on a neoclas-
sical production function in which inputs are
used up to the point where the value of their
marginal product is equal to their cost of use. In
such a context, current input capital should be
measured as the maximum potential flow of serv-
ices available from the measured stock. Such a
measure of capital can be constructed with the
perpetual inventory technique by using a depre-
ciation function that reflects the decline in the
asset's ability to produce as much output as
when it was originally purchased. This approach
is used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) for national-level estimates of both private
and government assets and in many national and
regional studies of total factor productivity.
This approach has been used recently by
Eberts, Fogarty, and Garofalo (see Eberts, Dalen-
berg, and Park [ 1986] for details) to construct
estimates of five functional types of public infra-
structure for 40 metropolitan areas from 1958 to
1985. Public outlays for each city since 1904
were obtained from City Finances and other U.S.
Bureau of the Ceasus publications, and were
aggregated using average asset lives, deprecia-
tion, and discard functions used by the BEA and
other sources to obtain capital stock measures.
The size and rankings of total public capital
stock for each standard metropolitan statistical
area (SMSA) in 1985 (measured in 1967 dollars)
are presented in table 1 as an illustration of the
estimates such a method would yield. The per
capita estimates of public capital stock reveal a
wide \-ariation across SMSAs in the amount of
capital invested and presumably in the amount
of infrastructure sen-ices offered within these
areas. In addition, the growth rates of public and
private capital stock for the 40 SMSAs are shown
in table 2. These estimates illustrate the general
slowdown in public capiuil stock accumulation.
The notable exceptions to this trend are in the
faster-growing regions of the country.
Capital stock estimates have also been con-
structed for other levels of aggregation. Costa,
Ellson. and Martin (198"
7) use similar techniques
to construct public capital stock for states,
although with a much shorter time period. Bos-
kin. Robinson, and Huber ( W) estimate capital
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NOTE SMSAs are listed from largest to smallest public capital stix-k.
SOURCE: Author's calculalioas.
stock series aggregated across all state and kxal
governments, to critique the BEA's methodology
in constructing its state and local public capital
stock series aggregated to the national level.
Leven, Legler, and Shapiro (1970) advocate
using physical measures of public infrastructure
to avoid problems related to the use of prices in
the monetary approach. In order to account for
differences in capacity and quality, as the price
and depreciation measures do to some extent in
the first method, they propose to collect informa-
tion on the physical characteristics of these assets
that reflect capacity and quality. In the case of
highways, for example, they cite a study that
converts physical characteristics of highways to .
estimates of the traffic flow capacity.
Although their approach avoids the issue of
asset prices, there are problems with this
approach as well. One issue is the monumental
task of collecting adequate measures of the phys-
ical size and quality of each type of public infra-
structure. For the private sector, it would be vir-
tually impossible because of the diverse types of
capital in use. For the public sector, the task is
somewhat less formidable because public capi-
tal, as Leven, Legler, and Shapiro suggest, can be
classified into a few dozen basic types.
Another issue is how to enter these various
measures into a regression analysis that relates
public infrastructure to economic activity. Enter-
ing more than a half dozen public infrastructure
measures simultaneously into a regression equa-
tion would introduce a number of estimation
problems, including multicollineariry. Further-
more, how would one interpret the separate
effects of miles of roads versus cargo capacity of
ports, for example? In addition, it may prove use-
ful at some point to construct broader classifica-
tions of infrastructure, for example combining
roads, highways, and bridges into a transporta-
tion network, which would be difficult to do
under this approach. Also, it would be more
convenient in regression analysis to have quality
differences incorporated within a single meas-
ure. Both requests would require some type of
aggregation scheme, perhaps more arbitrary than
using prices or user costs.
One alternative is to develop a hybrid approach.
The monetary estimates of public capital could
be benchmarked by using the physical quantity
and quality measures of public infrastructure.
This approach would improve the accuracy of
comparisons across metropolitan areas and over
time by essentially adjusting the price of capital
for differences in quality and quantity.
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and Regional Economic'
Economic development depends primarily on
locational advantage, whether it is between cit-
ies, states, or countries. Firms seek areas that
offer greater opportunities for economic profit.
Public infrastructure can enhance these oppor-
tunities either .by increasing productivity or by
reducing factor costs; that is, by augmenting the
efficiency of private inputs employed by firms or
by providing an attractive environment within
which households are willing to accept lower
wages in order to reside.
Regional Models
Regional and national economic growth
depends on processes that are more complex
than simply the aggregation of independent
decisions of firms and households. The deci-
sions of economic agents are inextricably inter-
twined, and this interdependent must be taken
into account in order to explain the process of
development. The traditional, neoclassical view
of regional development ignores this interde-
pendence and relies heavily on the notion that
capital is perfectly mobile between regions. As
described by Romans (1965), capital tends to
flow toward those regions offering the highest
price and away from regions offering the lowest
price, maintaining at all times an equilibrium of
price equality after subtracting transport costs.
The price of capital is determined by supply and
demand. The supply in a region continually
adjusts via imports and exports to changes in
regional demand so as to maintain interregional
price equality.
Richardson (1973) and other regional econo-
mists dismiss this framework as too simplistic.
Instead, they maintain that regional investment
decisions are characterized by the durability of
capital, the sequential and interdependent nature
of spatial investment decisions, the importance
of indivisibilities in the regional economy, spa-
tial frictioas on interregional capital flows, and
the distinction between private-sector capital and
public infrastructure. The interdependence
between public-sector investment and private-
sector investment is paramount to understanding
the regional development prcx'ess and for pre-
scribing regional economic development policy.
I^ven, Legler, and Shapiro (1970) provide a
simple picture of the feedback relationships
between public and private investment decisions.
Their model recognizes that an important share
of the regional capital stock consists of social
and public capital and that the scale and spatial
distribution of public capital may have a signifi
cant impact on subsequent private investment
decisions and on the location decisions made by
firms and households. Since the initial size and
distribution of the public capital stock is at least
partly predetermined by the prior spatial distri-
bution of households and economic activities in
the region, an interdependent system emerges.
Once growth in such a system is under way,
the process can easily become self-sustaining
and cumulative. However, if the initial popula-
tion and level of activity are small, and their spa-
tial distribution costly and inefficient, a region
may remain in a low-level equilibrium trap
(Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny [ 1989]). In such a
case, attempts to promote regional growth may
need the exogenous injection of public and
social capital expenditures to generate an expan-
sion rather than merely as a response to changes
in the level and spatial distribution of population
and economic activity. The difficulty with this
approach, as Richardson points out, is that we
know very little about the generative impact of
various types of public infrastructure on private
investment decisions. Furthermore, we know lit-
tle about the effect of a region's economic con-
ditions on infrastructure's contribution to output.
Hansen (1965) theorizes that the potential
effectiveness of economic overhead capital will
vary across three broad categories of regions:
congested, intermediate, and lagging. Congested
regions are characterized by very high concentra-
tions of population, industrial and commercial
activities, and public infrastructure. Any marginal
social benefits that might accrue from further
investment would be outweighed by the margin-
al social costs of pollution and congestion result-
ing from increased economic activity. Interme-
diate regions are characterized by an environment
conducive to further activity—an abundance of
well-trained labor, cheap power, and raw mate-
rials. Here, increased economic activity resulting
from infrastructure investment would lead to
marginal social benefits exceeding marginal
social costs. Lagging regions are characterized by
a low standard of living due to small-scale agri-
culture or stagnant or declining industries. The
economic situation offers little attraction to firms,
and public infrastructure investment would have
little impact.
A number of policy implications emerge from
this regional growth theory. The most obvious
policy conclusion is that subsidies for infrastruc-
ture investment are more likely to pay off in the
long run than investment incentives to firms and
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following Hansen (1965) and Hirsch'man (1958),
the main task of infrastructure subsidies for
underdeveloped areas is to generate the minimum
critical size of urbanization that can serve as a
core for economic development. For these lag-
ging regions, however, infrastructure may not be
enough to attract firms; additional means such as
wage subsidies may be necessary. Finally, a
major outcome of a spatial approach to regional
growth analysis is the need for more coordina-
tion between government agencies at all levels
and for the integration of all infrastructure deci-
sions in an overall regional development strategy.
Before the wisdom of such policies can be
assessed, a number of questions must be an-
swered For example, how do we identify the
mechanisms by which infrastructure investment
generates regional growth? What types of infra-
structure investment are crucial for promoting
regional growth? Partial answers are found in the
literature.
Empirical Findings
A direct test of Hansen's hypotheses about the
effects of public infrastructure on regional
development is provided by Looney and Freder-
iksen (1981). Unfortunately from the perspective
of U.S. policy, they examine economic develop-
ment in Mexico. Their findings support Hansen's
intuition, however: economic overhead capital •
lias a significant effect on gross domestic product
for intermediate regions but not for lagging
regions; social overhead capital exhibits the
opposite effect, as Hansen predicted.
Costa et al. (1987) support Hansen's hypothesis
of differential impacts of infrastructure on regional
growth using VS. data. They find that the larger
the stock of public capital relative to private capi-
tal within a state, and the larger the stock of pub-
lic capital per capita, the smaller the impact of
public capital stock on manufacturing production.
Eberts (1986) also finds regional differentials in
the effectiveness of public capital on manufactur-
ing output. He reports that public capital was
more effective in SMSAs in the South than in the
North and in SMSAs with a lower amount of pub-
lic capital relative to private capital and labor.
Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1989). examining 28
metropolitan areas from 1980 through 1984, find
that public capital stock has positive and statisti-
cally significant effects on per capita personal
income. The effects come through two channels:
first, through the actual construction of the public
capital stock: and second, through public capital
stock as an unpaid factor in the production proc-
ess and a consumption good of households. This
second effect is twice as large as the first effect
using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation,
but the relative magnitudes of the two effects are
roughly reversed using two-stage least squares
(2SLS).
Other evidence of the differential effects of
public infrastructure among regions comes from
analysis of the operation of U.S. federal regional
development programs on the growth rates of per-
sonal income for different categories of distressed
areas. Martin (1979) finds that investment in pub-
lic capital yields few gains for low-income areas,
but that business development and planning/
technical assistance are more effective in high-
unemployment areas.
Mera (1975) provides one of the most compre-
hensive analyses of the effect of public infrastruc-
ture on regional economic growth for the United
States. He hypothesizes that the growth of regional
economic activity is determined primarily by the
growth of public infrastructure and technical
progress in the region. The growth of labor and
private capital, which are allocated through price
differentials, responds to growth differentials in
social capital and technical progress. He exam-
ines the growth characteristics of the nine US.
census regions from 1947 to 1963- Mera con-
cludes that more-developed regions are growing
because of the growth of public infrastructure,
while less-developed regions are growing pri-
marily because of the growth of technology.
Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1987) estimate the
contribution of state educational and highway
expenditures to gross state product. Using
pooled cross-section time-series data from 1970
to 1983, they estimate a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function with these two public inputs along
with manufacturing capital stock and production
employees as the private inputs. They find that
highway capital stock and educational expendi-
tures have a positive and significant effect on
gross state product, with educational expendi-
tures having the larger impact.
Other studies support these findings. For
example. Helms (1985) shows that government
expenditures on highways, local schools, and
higher education positively and significantly
affect state personal income. A study of the
effects of public investment in rural areas by the
CONSAD Research Corporation (1969) attempts
to assess the effect of public works investment
on the growth of real income in 195 small Mis-
souri municipalities. This study finds that public
works infrastructure accounted for 30 percent of
the gain in real income between 1963 and 1966.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1990 Q 1
Best available copyOf the major investment projects considered,
federal highways, barge docks, vocational
schools, and recreational facilities contributed
the most to income growth.
III. Public Infrwtructun
and Hrm
Is the effect of public infrastructure on regional
growth a result of an overall increase in firm-
level productivity or an increase in the region's
attractiveness to labor and capital? Hulten and
Schwab's (1984) research on regional productivity
differentials lends some insight into this distinc-
tion. They test the hypothesis that the economic
decline of the Snowbelt was due to differences
in economic efficiency relative to the Sunbelt, by
calculating regional differences in total factor
productivity (TFP). They find little support for
this hypothesis, determining instead that these
interregional differences are largely a result of
differences in the growth rate of capital and labor.
Thus, the implication from these findings is that
regional differences in the quality and quantity
of public infrastructure may have a greater effect
on the migration decisions of factors of produc-
tion than on productivity differentials.
There is another reason to look at factors of
production rather than at Hicks-neutral produc-
tivity changes in analyzing the effect of public
infrastructure. If public infrastructure is indeed
an input (as will be discussed later in this sec-
tion), then relating public infrastructure to a
measure of TFP, which includes only labor and
private capital as inputs, may be a misspecifica-
tion of the relationship. Munnell (1990) raises
this issue for explaining TFP at the national level.
When public capital is entered into the TFP cal-
culations as a third input, she finds that the varia-
tion in TFP over time reflects more a change in
public infrastructure than a change in technolog-
ical innovation.
Very little attention has been given to the
technological relationships between public
infrastructure and other inputs in a firm's pro-
duction process. The extant literature addresses
this issue primarily from a theoretical stand-
point. Three basic questions are considered:
1) How does public infrastructure enter the pro-
duction process: as a factor-augmenting
atmosphere-type input or as an unpaid input?
2) What implications do these two types of pub-
lic inputs have on the efficient allocation of
'resources?
3) What effect do public inputs have on a firm's
profits, and thus on an urea's locational
advantage?
Infrastructure
it i Public Input
The basic premise of the theoretical literature is
that public infrastructure may increase firm pro-
ductivity either through increasing the efficiency
of private inputs employed by firms or through
its own direct contribution to production as an
input into the production process. Economists
have taken both approaches. Meade's (1952)
classification of external economies distin-
guishes between these two approaches. Meade
refers to the first type of public input as the crea-
tion of atmosphere. It is analogous to Samuel-
son's pure public good and is exemplified by
free information or technology. In this case, an
increase in the level of public inputs results in
increased output for all firms through neutral
increases in the efficiency with which the private
inputs are used. Any firm entering a region
immediately benefits from the existing level of
public input without affecting the benefits from
the public input received by other firms.
In more formal terms, public inputs are consid-
ered to enter the production function as factors
that augment the productivity of each of the pri-
vate inputs. If a firm is assumed to operate in a
perfectly competitive environment, then each
private factor of production receives a payment,
equal to the value of its contribution to output.
Factors, whose productivity has been enhanced
by public inputs, receive compensation higher
than they would receive in the absence of public
inputs. For example, suppose that government-
supported research and worker training pro-
grams targeted at the electronics industry
increase the productivity of labor and capital
employed by an electronics firm. Workers and
owners of capital receive higher compensation
because of increased productivity. However,
since the firm's entire revenue has been distrib-
uted among the private factors of production, no
revenue is left to pay for public inputs. Thus,
public inputs will not be supplied without
government intervention.
Meade refers to the second type of public input
as an unpaid factor. An example is free access
roads. This input has private-good characteristics,
except that it is not provided through a market
pnxess and thus is not paid for on a per-unit
basis and does not have a market-determined
price. Its private-good characteristics generally
result from congestion. In the case of highways,
as the number of firms in a region expands,
increased use of the highways results in conges-
tion, which effectively reduces the total amount
of highway .services available to each firm. Thus,
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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input is fixed, unless the facility is continually
underutilized.
Having many characteristics of a private input,
the unpaid-factor type of public input is entered
into the production process in the same way as
private inputs. Unlike the first case, the public
input does not augment the productivity of the
private inputs. Rather, it contributes independ-
ently to the firm's output. Because firms, by defi-
nition, do not pay directly for the public input,
they initially earn profits or rents according to
the value of the marginal product of the public
input It is usually assumed that the rent accrues
to some ownership factor such as capital or entre-
preneurship. As with a private unpriced input,
these profits from the public good will attract
other firms into the industry (or area). As addi-
tional firms enter the industry, the per-firm usage
of the public input declines relative to other
inputs. Before and after entry into an industry,
capital or the factor collecting the accrued rent is
paid the value of its marginal product plus the
rent to the unpriced factor. The influx of firms
increases the ratio of private inputs to public
inputs, causing the marginal product of public-
inputs to rise relative to private inputs. Local
governments, acting as agents for these firms,
increase the allocation of public investment rela-
tive to the private inputs because of its high
marginal productivity. Additional firms move into
the region until the rents are dissipated and capi-
tal earns a competitive rate of return.
Optimal Allocation
of Public Inputs
The two types of public inputs have different
implications concerning the efficient allocation
of resources, the level of provision of the public
inputs, and the appropriate financing arrange-
ments. For the first case, Samuelson's conditions
for the allocation of pure public goods apply.
Kaizuka (1965) and Sandmo (1972) show that
resources are allocated efficiently when the total
savings of all firms brought about by substituting
a public input for a single private input are equal
to the resource cost of using that pri\-ate input to
produce the public input. However, because of
the free-rider problem, government must supply
the intermediate input. The revenue necessary
for government to provide the service must be
raised by some form of taxation or user charges.
Negishi (1973) demonstrates that for a pure
public input, an optimal level of public g(xxJ will
be produced if the government supplies a level
of public inputs that maximizes the joint net
profit of industries. The firm's ability to deter-
mine the allocation of public investments is
defended by Downs (1957), who argues that a
firm's lobbying activities sufficiently influence
government decisions. However, when household
preferences for public expenditures are repre-
sented by majority rule voting, public goods are
in general not optimally supplied. Pestieau
(1976) shows that only under very restrictive
assumptions will majority voting lead to an
optimal supply of the public input. In most
cases, it will oversupph/ public inputs.
The same optimality conditions hold for the
case of an unpaid factor of production, but the
level of provision is different. Negishi shows that
for an unpaid factor, the public good most likely
will be oversupplied when the government tries
to maximize the joint net profit of firms in the
long run. He offers the following explanation.
Since returns to public goods are imputed to
capital in the case of the unpaid factor, capital
tends to concentrate excessively in industries
that can enjoy more gains from public expendi-
tures than other industries. Unless public goods
and capital are perfect substitutes, the capital
intensity of the industry raises the productivity of
public goods, which implies that more of the
public good is required to maximize trie-Indus-
try's profits. Thus, allocation is inefficient even
without the additional complication of house-
hold preferences and majority rule voting.
Financing Public
Infn structure
These theoretical results highlight the impor-
tance of the total fiscal package, not simply taxes
or public investment, in firm location decisions.
As previously mentioned, firms with access to
public infrastructure earn rents according to the
value of the contribution of public infrastructure
to production. In the unpaid factor case, a por-
tion of these rents (if not all rents) may be taxed
or paid out as user charges in order to finance
public infrastructure. The amount of rents
remaining with the firm as a result of public-
unpaid factors depends on the taxing scheme
adopted and on properties of the production
process or utilization of public inputs.
For any given level of public investment, the
amount of rents accruing to firms depends on
the sharing arrangements between taxpayers
inside and outside a local jurisdiction. For
example, if public infrastructure is financed
entirely by individuals outside the area (through
federal grants, for example), then a firm receives
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incentive for that firm and others to locate in the
area. On the other hand, if the entire burden of
financing the public infrastructure investment
falls on individuals within the local area, then
profits would be much smaller, creating less of
an incentive for firms to locate or remain there.
Another arrangement is for households to
assume a larger proportion of the financing costs
of public investment than warranted by the
direct benefits they receive. Some communities
pursue this approach through tax moratoriums
and lower tax rates for firms, with the idea that
the benefits to the community from creating new
jobs outweigh the increased burden of financing
the investment
An additional feature of the fiscal package is
that taxes need not equal the total rents accruing
to firms (and even to households). Benefits from
public investment projects characterized by econ-
omies of scale and sharing properties will exceed
the cost of the project Since many components
of public infrastructure, such as highways and
water distribution and treatment facilities, exhibit
these properties, it is reasonable to assume that
public investment may have a net positive effect
on firm productivity and thus on firm location.
Empirical Findings
A number of basic questions emerge from the
theoretical foundations of the relationship
between infrastructure and firm-level behavior.
1) How does public capital enter into the pro-
duction process?
2) What effect does public infrastructure have on
a firm's productivity? How does this vary with
the type of firm and type of infrastructure?
3) Are private and public capital related as sub-
stitutes or complements?
4) What effect does public infrastructure have on
firm location decisions?
Only recently have researchers estimated the
technical relationships between public infrastruc-
ture and other production inputs. Previously, the
literature looked primarily at peripheral issues
such as the effects of federal programs on eco-
nomic growth in distressed areas or the effects of
various government expenditures on firm loca-
tion. These are undoubtedly important questions,
but their particular focus does not provide much
insight into the technical relationships outlined
above. Another problem with the earlier studies
is that, with the exception of Mer.i (19"3, 1975),
they use public expenditures or the number of
government employees as proxies for public
infrastructure.
More recent studies have tried to address these
issues directly by estimating production functions
with public capital-stock estimates included as
inputs. Eberts (1986) estimates the direct effect
of public capital stock on manufacturing output
and the technical relationships between public
capital and the other production inputs. Public
capital stock is estimated using the perpetual
inventory technique, described in section I, for
each of 38 U.S. metropolitan areas between 1958
and 1978. With this method, capital is measured
as the sum of the value of past investments
adjusted for depreciation and discard. Public cap-
ital stock includes highways, sewage treatment
facilities, and water distribution facilities within
the SMSA. He estimates a translog production
function with value added as output, hours of
production and nonproduction workers as the
labor input, and a value measure of private
manufacturing capital stock as private capital.
Eberts finds that public capital stock makes a
positive and statistically significant contribution
to manufacturing output, supporting the concept
of public capital stock as an unpaid factor of
production. Its output elasticity of .03 is small
relative to the magnitudes of the other inputs:
0.7 for labor and 0.3 for private capital. It follows
that the magnitude of the marginal product of
public capital is also relatively small.
The small estimated contribution of public
capital may be \iewed in two ways. If one con-
siders public capital stock to-be a pure public
good, then the marginal product of public capi:
tal stock reveals the manufacturing sector's valua-
tion of the total stock of public investment in
place in the SMSA. If local governments allocate
public funds in response to the preferences of
the local voters, then the marginal valuation
should be equal to their tax share. Thus, it is not
unreasonable that a typical firm pays 4 percent of
its total value added to local taxes—a value close
to the marginal product of public capital.
Another way to interpret the results is to
assume that the manufacturing sector uses only a
specific portion of the stock. For instance, firms
may be spatially concentrated in one area of the
metropolitan area and thus intensively use only
the roads and sewer systems in that part of the
region. If one assumes that the per-unit cost of
constructing one unit of private capital is the
.same as the per-unit cost of constructing one unit
of public capital, then the marginal products of
the mi) capital inputs should be equal. Estimates
show, however, that the marginal product of pri-
vate capital is seven times that of the marginal
product of public capital. This difference may
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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tor uses the total capital stock instead of some
portion of it. If one assumes that the use of the
total public capital sux^k by manufacturing firms
is approximately proportional to manufacturing
employment's share of the total population, then
the use of the public capital stock is overesti-
mated by roughly seven times. Multiplying the
marginal product of public capital stock by seven
brings it in line with the marginal product of pri-
vate capital.
With respect to technical relationships, Eberts
finds that public capital and private capital are
complements, while the private capital/labor
pair and the public capital/labor pair are substi-
tutes. Public and private capital are interpreted to
be complements when an increase in the level
of public capital reduces the price of private cap-
ital by increasing its relative abundance. Dalen-
berg (1987), using the same data as Eberts but
estimating a cast function, also finds public capi-
tal and private capital to be complements.
Deno (1986) also estimates technical relation-
ships, but uses investment data instead of capital
stock data. Using pooled data for U.S. metropoli-
tan areas from 1972 to 1978, he estimates labor
and private investment demand equations
derived from a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion. He finds that local public investment and
private capital are complements. In addition, he
finds that a 1 percent increase in public invest-
ment is associated with a 0.01 percent increase
in net private investment in the short run and a
0.2 percent increase in the long run. Further-
more, he concludes that public investment has a
significantly greater positive effect on net private
capital formation in distressed cities than in
growth cities. In subsequent work. Deno (1988)
finds the output elasticities of water, sewer, and
highway infrastructure for the full sample of 36
SMSAs are 0.08, 0.30, and 0.31. respectively.
These estimates were obtained using a profit
function approach for the period 19~0 to 1978.
At the state level, Costa et al. (198") estimate
the contribution of public capital stock to manu-
facturing output by estimating a translog produc-
tion function. Their analysis differs from that of
Eberts in two key ways, in addition to the unit of
analysis. First, Costa et al. estimate the prcxluc-
tion function using cross-sectional data for 1972.
while F,berts combines cross-sectional and time
series data in his estimation. Second. Costa et al.
distribute the BF.A estimate of capital among
states in proportion to the gross book value of
fixed assets at year-end 19~1. The private capital
stixk used by Eherts. on the other hand, is based
on the same perpetual inventory technique used
to construct the public capita! stex'k.
Costa et al. also find that public capital stock
makes a statistically significant contribution to
manufacturing output. However, the magnitudes
of their public capital elasticities are higher tlian
what Eberts found, which may be partly explained
by their inclusion of more categories of public
investment. Another difference between the
results of these studies is that Costa et al. find
private and public capital to be substitutes and
public capital and labor to be complements,
while Eberts and Deno find the opposite. One
explanation for the difference may be in the cal-
culation of these relationships. Costa et al. use
the log form of the production function to derive
the cross-partial derivative, while Eberts converts
back to the original production relationship to
compute the technical relationships.
Mera (1973) estimates the technical relation-
ships between various types of infrastructure and
other inputs for Japan. Using pooled data of nine
regions in 10 years from 1954 to 1963, he esti-
mates a Cobb-Douglas production function for
each of three major economic sectors and four
types of infrastructure. He reports the following
findings: (1) when the infrastructure variable is
entered as a separate factor of production, its
production elasticity ranges from 0.1 to 0.5, most
frequently around 0.2; (2) the transportation and
communication infrastructure appears to have a
sizable effect on mining, manufacturing, and
construction-, (3) in most cases, the rates of
return from infrastructure are similar to those of
private capital; but (4) the elasticity of substitu-
tion between private capital and infrastructure is
undetermined in this stud)'.
Studies of the determinants of firm location
usually concentrate more on the effect of taxes
than on the effect of expenditures on location
decisions. However, those studies that have
included various measures of public infrastruc-
ture have found that certain forms of infrastruc-
ture are attractive to firms. Some of the strongest
results were reported by Fox and Murray (1988),
who found that the presence of interstate high-
way systems had a positive and highly significant
effect on the location of individual establish-
ments in the state of Tennessee. Banik (1985),
using a national sample, also found that the
number of new branch plants was higher within
states with more miles of roads. Eberts (1990)
offers evidence that public infrastructure posi-




Best available copyIV. Public Infrastructure
and Households
Public infrastructure may also affect the migra-
tion decisions of households by enhancing the
area's amenities. However, the existing literature
related to household location decisions does not
focus much on public infrastructure. Labor migra-
tion studies tend to concentrate primarily on
demographic characteristics and wage differentials
to explain migration flows. Urban quality-of-life
comparisons, which deal with the same underly-
ing decision process, come closer to addressing
this issue, but their major focus is on attributes
such as air quality, climate, and so forth.
One exception is the migration study by Fox,
Herzog, and Schlonmann (1989). They estimate
the effect of local fiscal expenditures and revenue
on household decisions to migrate across met-
ropolitan areas. Using Public Use Microdata
Samples, which record a household's place of
residence in 1975 and 1980, they determine that
fiscal variables are more important factors in
pushing people from an area than in attracting
them toward one. They explain this result in
terms of information. Information on fiscal struc-
ture is more readily available in an area where a
person has been living than for areas under con-




Most of the studies that address the stimulative
effect of public investment presume that public-
investment "causes" or precedes private capital.
Yet, scant attention has been given to testing this
relationship. Eberts and Fogam
1 (1987) explore
the causal relationship between public and pri-
vate investment. Their premise, following the
cumulative model of regional growth, is that the
timing of investment indicates the role of public
investment in promoting local economic devel-
opment. If public investment precedes private
investment, then it would appear that kxal areas
actively use public outlays as instruments to
direct local development. On the other hand, if
the sequence of events occurs in the opposite
direction, it would appear that lcx'al officials
merely respond to private investment decisions.
Using data on public capital outlays and manu-
facturing investment from 190-i to 1978 for 40
U.S. cities, Eberts and Fogarry find a significant
causal relationship between public outlays and
private investment in 33 of the -lO metropolitan
areas examined. The direction of causation goes
both ways. Private investment is more likely to
influence public outlays in cities located in the
South and in cities that have experienced tre-
mendous growth after 1950. Public outlays are
more likely to influence private investment in
cities that experienced much of their growth
before 1950.
Looney and Frederiksen (1981), in their study
of Mexico, support the findings of Eberts and
Fogarty for older VS. cities—that public invest
ment appears to be the initiating factor in the
development process, rather than a passive or
accommodating factor. They do not attempt to
determine whether causal directions differ across
types of regions, however.
VI. Overall Assessment
The importance of public infrastructure in pro-
moting economic development has been widely-
recognized among policymakers. Economists
have only recently begun to assess the effects of
infrastructure on regional economic develop-
ment beyond simply a stimulus of construction
activity. The consensus among economists is that
public infrastructure stimulates economic activ-
ity, either by augmenting the productivity of pri-
vate inputs or through its direct contribution to
output. Furthermore, by enhancing a region's
amenities, public infrastructure may also attract
households and firms, which further contributes
to an area's growth.
Results show that public capital stock signifi-
cantly affects economic activity. The magnitudes
of the effects for public capital are much less
than for private capital, however. Results also
show, with some exception, that public capital
and private capital are complements, not substi-
tutes. This relationship may be interpreted to
mean that the existence of public infrastructure
is a necessary precondition for economic growth.
Evidence suggests that the effect of public
infrastructure on regional development depends
on the type of investment and on the economic
conditions of the region. Studies of Japan and
Mexico, in particular, show that investment in
communications and transportation appears to
have the most significant impact on regional
growth. In the United States, public investment
appears to have a greater effect on economic
activity in distressed cities than in growth cities,
in Sunbelt cities than in Northern cities, and in
those areas with less public capital stock relative
to private capital and population.
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does an additional increase in public infrastruc-
ture cease to have any effect on economic-
development? Alder (1965) sums up the effect of
transportation on economic development: "It is
frequently assumed that all transport improve-
ments stimulate economic growth. The sad truth
is that some do, and some do not...." In a
broader context, it can be concluded that some
types of infrastructure investment will have sig-
nificant effects, while others will not.
Many local and state governments in the United
States are faced with the monumental task of
replacing and upgrading their present public
capital stock. But the challenge is more than
simply maintaining existing structures. The chal-
lenge facing these governments is to meet the
future infrastructure needs of a US, economy
that is undergoing dramatic changes with the
restructuring of both manufacturing and service
industries and the spatial redistribution of these
activities. Innovations in areas such as telecom-
munications and computer automation, to men-
tion only two, are changing the way businesses
operate, and infrastructure investment must
adapt to this changing technology. Results from
studies reported in this paper underline the
importance of maintaining, improving, and
expanding public capital stock in order to sup-
port future economic growth.
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